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Abstract
We have designed a novel security system, called Web
Content Verification and Recovery (WCVR) system to solve
unauthorised tampering on server-side web content. Our
solution is implemented as a prototype. This prototype con-
sists of three mechanisms: web register, HTTP interface,
and response hashing. In this paper, we have conducted
a set of experiential studies to meet the security and per-
formance objectives. The results of an experimental study
have shown that the proposed system (WCVR) provides a
high coverage of detection and protection, and a low level
of overhead times.
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1. Introduction
Although current security mechanisms could provide a
protection against unauthorised access to system resources,
several security incident reports from emergency response
teams such as The Computer Emergency Response Team
(CERT) clearly demonstrate that the available security
mechanisms have not made system break-ins impossible
[3]. Note that, the three basic objectives of web security
include confidentially, integrity, and availability of data.
Data integrity has received little attention in information
security research and technical security groups and com-
munities. Furthermore, there is little published research in
methods for testing web content integrity [7]. The published
research and technical communities in web security area are
generally more concerned with cryptographic rules, and al-
gorithms. In an attempt to address this, our paper focuses
on the integrity of data and does not delve into other is-
sues of data. If the integrity of data is violated, its confi-
dentiality and availability can be compromised. It should
be noted that data integrity refers to the trustworthiness of
information resources, thereby ensuring that only an autho-
rised client can alter the data – unauthorised tampering may
result in incorrect or malicious web application behaviour
behind installed firewalls [4, 5, 11].
Server-side static and dynamic web content can be tam-
pered with by modifying the style classes, referenced ob-
jects (images, audio, video, and other objects), the source
code of the web page itself, and also by running malicious
code on the server to intercept a requested page before the
client receives it [4, 5, 6, 8, 11]. The attackers are inter-
ested on targeting the referenced objects and page code on
the fly. For example, it is possible to replace an original
image by another image containing malicious code. A vic-
tim requests the altered image and then it can disrupt the
contents of a web server or client machine. In addition, the
Cascading Style Sheet (CSS) object is threatened through a
visualization spoofing attack. The strategy of this attack is
to change any important information that is identified by a
particular colour to another colour the objective is to ma-
nipulate the user into making a decision that is based on
incorrect information.
The Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) protocol was developed
to support the integrity of data transit [4, 5, 11], and as such,
it does not provide an absolute solution. SSL is not capable
of verifying the integrity of web content before a request
or response enters the secure communication channel [11].
As a result of the transparency of code at the web browser
level, the following approaches can cause loss of data in-
tegrity: hidden fields and script manipulation, and analysis
of validation code through reverse engineering techniques
[6, 10].
Dynamic data is also a critical issue [6, 9]. The gener-
ation of dynamic web content depends on user interaction.
Different user information leads to different generated web
content. Therefore, it is very difficult (even impossible) to
analyse the requested page of dynamic code before process-
ing on a web server. The dynamic code of server program-
ming languages needs to be processed on a web server be-
fore returning the response to a web browser. As a result, we
cannot guarantee that dynamic code is not tampered with
even if the static code is verified; therefore the generated
web content should also be verified.
Indeed, the verification of web server content integrity
is becoming more important, because many web applica-
tions generate units of web content on the fly. It is there-
fore important to develop systems for integrity verification
that are able to provide web content protection, detection of
malicious manipulation of web content, protection against
tampering, and authentication of content [1, 2].
This paper is organized as follows: Section 2 gives an
overview of the existing integrity verification approaches
and systems. Section 3 outlines a proposed integrity verifi-
cation system. Section 4 describes the prototype of WCVR
implementation and its mechanisms. In Section 5, we
present an experimental study to measure the performance
through the proposed system on IIS and Apache Tomcat
web servers. Finally, Section 6 draws conclusions.
2. Existing Integrity verification approaches
We now discuss the three recent approaches that attempt
to address the tampering problems on the server-side web
content. First, Hassinen and Mussalo [5] propose a client-
side encryption system to protect data integrity and user
trust. The client encryption key is located on a client smart
card or can be stored on the server and transferred over an
HTTP connection.
However, integrity of data could be lost if this approach
is adopted because Java applets can access the client’s lo-
cal file system. Thus, a criminal can replace the original
signed applet with a faked applet to access the client’s web
content. Another potential weakness is the loss of the client
smart card with its Personal Identification Number (PIN).
Consequently, the whole web-based system can be compro-
mised. Furthermore, applet and JavaScript methods can be
bypassed. If this happens, the submitted values will be in
plain text. Finally, existing web applications would require
modification to implement this technique.
Sedaghat, Pieprzyk, and Vossough [11] proposed a Dy-
namic Security Surveillance Agent (DSSA) tool on the
server that automatically intercepts a request to verify the
integrity of the requested page before the web server re-
sponds to the client. The verification uses the timestamp
signature technique. However, tampering is still a poten-
tial problem because DSSA does not verify dynamic web
content on the server.
Third, the Adaptive Intrusion-Tolerant Server system
[12] consists of redundant servers, proxies that are posi-
tioned between web servers and client machines to verify
the behaviour of servers. When a client request arrives a
proxy “leader” intercepts the request, analyzes it, and for-
wards it to a number of application servers, depending on
the enforced policy. Furthermore, a leader intercepts the re-
sponses to find a hash value for them. If they match, the
leader sends a response to the user, otherwise, a report is
sent to a monitoring component to take the correct action.
However, it does not verify the integrity of referenced ob-
jects that are generated dynamically.
3. Web Content Verification and Recovery
(WCVR) System
As discussed above, the problem to be addressed is that
the integrity of the dynamic and static web content on a
server can be compromised even though the communication
channel between the client and server-sides is secured. We
have proposed a survivable system to identify tampering at-
tacks, and therefore, we have developed aWeb Content Ver-
ification and Recovery (WCVR) system to investigate into
a server-side static and dynamic web content survivability
before the client receives the requested page.
In this paper, the survivability is the capability of a web
content to continue its mission over the HTTP request-
response model even in the presence of illegitimate modi-
fications (modifications caused by tampering attacks) to a
web content. The question then arises, what happens when
a altered web content has been detected? Our survivability
strategy in the proposed WCVR system can be set up in two
steps:
1. Detection and response by integrity verification pro-
cess.
2. Recovering from tampering attacks by recovery pro-
cess.
3.1. Architecture of web security framework
The proposed framework consists of a number of com-
ponents as shown in Figure 1 [1]:
• DBMS tables: we create two DBMS tables: offline-
transaction table for mapping the hash values of static
web contents to their specific repositories of web
servers, and online-transaction table for mapping the
hash value of current dynamic web content to its server
scripting web page.
• Web register component: calculates the hash values of
static web contents that have developed for use in a
secure web environment.
• Integrity verifier (manager): is positioned between the
client machines and the target web server. This com-
ponent manages the HTTP requests and responses via
a state protocol that enforces a number of web poli-
cies (such as request availability policy, integrity fail-
ure policy, integrity passing policy, and recovery pol-
icy) that apply to the elements of the web system.
• Response hashing calculator: aims to do hashing cal-
culations, and backup for the generated dynamic web
content before response sends it back to the manager.
• Recovery component: recovers the tampered web con-
tent.
It should be noted that the proposed framework is sepa-
rate from the web server. In addition, the components of the
framework do not need to run on a dedicated machine, they
can be run as separate processes on the server. The WCVR
system has a number of advantages over other approaches:
1. It does not require modifications to existing web appli-
cation architectures,
2. It does not require any additional changes on the client
and server, and
3. It is compatible with all major web browsers.
Database
DBMS
Figure 1. Schematic view of WCVR architecture
3.2. Functional Overview
We propose the functionality steps of the suggested solu-
tion. When a client request arrives, the following steps are
performed [1]:
1. The integrity verifier (manager) component intercepts
the HTTP request (such as web page, audio, video,
images, and others), checks it, analyses it, extracts
the hash value of the original copy of the static
web content from DBMS offline-transaction table, re-
calculates the hash value of the web content, and com-
pares the two hash values for integrity verification pro-
cess. If they match, then the integrity of the requested
web content is valid; otherwise, the the requested web
content has been tampered with. The integrity verifier
(manager) forwards the request to a web server if the
enforced web policy is satisfied. If it is not satisfied,
the integrity verifier sends the request to the recovery
component to identify the tampering problem and re-
ports this attack to web administrator.
2. Once a web server application has processed the re-
quest, the response hashing calculator component cal-
culates the hash value of output response and makes a
backup for the output response. The hash value of the
response (dynamic web content) is appended to DBMS
online-transaction table.
3. The response is intercepted by the integrity verifier
component. The manager analyses the response, ex-
tracts its original hash value (this value is appended to
the secured online-transaction table), re-calculates it,
and compares the two hash values for integrity veri-
fication process. If they match, then the integrity of
the response is valid; otherwise, the response has been
tampered with. Therefore, if it is not valid, the man-
ager sends the response to the recovery component to
identify the tampering problem and reports this to the
web administrator.
4. The integrity verifier component forwards the correct
response to the target client.
4. Implementation of WCVR system
The WCVR system is implemented in Java, Servlets,
and Filters. The DBMS Microsoft Access 2007 Database
is selected as the repository for storing and retrieving de-
tails about static and dynamic web contents. In order to
demonstrate that our WCVR system is able to ensure the
survivability of server-side web content against tampering,
we have undertaken some experimental testing (see Section
5).
4.1. Architecture Design of the Prototype
The WCVR prototype consists of three mechanisms:
Web register, HTTP interface, and response hashing mech-
anism.
4.1.1. Web Register Mechanism
The functionalities of the web register mechanism are sum-
marized into the following:
• Reading in binary format for every static web content
in the secure repositories.
• Calculating the hash value for every static web content
using SHA1 function.
• Requesting Microsoft Access DBMS to store details
for every static web content.
• Checking the modification status for every static web
content, if modified, recalculate the hash value with
taking into account the new assembly of a private key
which is used in SHA1 hashing function.
4.1.2. Response Hashing Mechanism
This mechanism aims to calculate the hash value of the out-
put response (dynamic web content) which is generated by a
server scripting language such as JSP, ASP, PERL, and oth-
ers, and to make online backup for the output response (the
produced dynamic web content) in a secure server reposi-
tories. The hash value of dynamic content is stored in the
DBMS online-transaction table for integrity check before
the client receives the requested page.
4.1.3. HTTP Interface Mechanism
The HTTP interface mechanism is the manager of the
WCVR system, and is based on the integrity verifier compo-
nent. This component launches a state protocol to enforce
the target web policy. The value of the web policy deter-
mines the action(s) should be taken by the HTTP interface
mechanism. All the web policies have been implemented in
this mechanism. The goals of HTTP interface mechanisms
are:
• Online verification of integrity of server-side static
web content.
• Online verification of integrity of server-side dynamic
web content.
• Online recovery of server-side static web content if the
static web content has been tampered with.
• Online recovery of server-side dynamic web content if
the dynamic web content has been tampered with.
In this paper, we have developed multi-threaded java ap-
plication for handling concurrent connections (requests in
parallel) using multiple threads that increase the power and
flexibility of a web server and client programs significantly.
5. Evaluation
We tested our system in environment which is composed
of two web servers: Apache 1.3.29 with Tomcat container
5.01 on MSWindows Server 2003, and IIS 6.0 on MSWin-
dows Server 2003. The two web servers contain a copy of
target web site and shopping cart application. The choice
of two web servers are dictated by the fact that they contain
many tampering vulnerabilities such as visualisation spoof-
ing attacks that can be easily exploited. Over 45 attacks
have been performed against the server-side generated static
and dynamic web content security properties. We have ex-
ploited different type of vulnerabilities that allows for the
modification of files in the designated directories of a web
server (attack against integrity). During the testing, all the
attacks launched against the web servers were detected and
recovered by the WCVR system.
5.1. Case Study for Micro-benchmarking Perfor-
mance
We measured the runtime performance of the web regis-
ter mechanism with a set of micro-benchmarks. We mea-
sured the latencies of web register mechanism in two differ-
ent cases, namely, SHA1 (10 digits), and SHA1-extended
(16 digits). In the SHA1 case, we calculated the hash value
of a web content by SHA1 function where number of digits
was 10. SHA1-extended represented the case when we cal-
culated the hash value of a web content by SHA1 function
where number of digits was 16. Since the goal is to measure
the latency, we ran the web register mechanism 15 times on
over 200 entries of different sizes for every case (SHA1 and
SHA1-extended) under MS Windows XP Professional.
An illustration of results is presented in Table 1. It is
clear from the table that the overhead of web register in the
case of SHA1 (10 digits) is low – the average running time
was 1.4274 seconds to run (the average of time taken to run
15 trails), less time than the case of SHA1-extended which
it was 2.2176 seconds to run. Note that these cases did not
only measure the overhead of the hash value itself, it also
measured all functions in a web register mechanism for both
cases, so that this difference of overhead results from using
two different cases of SHA1.
We have concluded that the SHA1-extended case is
clearly the most costly in performance terms to execute.
This is reasonable, because the SHA1-extended contains 16
digits instead of using 10 digits.
We have also presented the registry performance of a
web content as a function of file sizes. We measured the
web register mechanism running time for the both cases:
SHA1 and SHA1-extended, varying the input file sizes. The
results are shown in Table 2. When the file size is large,
the hashing overhead can be significant for both cases. For
example, measuring a 64 Kilobytes file had taken about
12.47 milliseconds in case of SHA1-extended, where it had
taken about 3.2 milliseconds in case of SHA1. Another
interesting result, measuring a 13 Megabytes file recorded
about 1531 milliseconds in case of SHA1-extended, where
it recorded about 620.067 milliseconds in case of SHA1.
The running time increased close to a linear state as the size
of file increased. Moreover, the hashing overhead of case
SHA1-extended takes more running time than case SHA1
and this increases as the size of file increases.
Table 1. Overhead of a web register mechanism
Web Register Call Overhead (ms)
SHA1-extended (16 digits) 2217.6 (2.2176s)
SHA1 (10 digits) 1427.4 (1.4274s)
Table 2. Registry Performance for both SHA1-extended
and SHA1 as compared with File Sizes.
File Size Overhead (ms) Overhead (ms)
(Byte) with SHA1-extended with SHA1
1KB 0.64 0.627
16KB 5.13 2.13
64KB 12.47 3.2
2MB 163.73 118.73
5MB 348 251.97
13MB 1531 620.067
The impact of hashing and encryption are issues that in-
crease the overhead and they are rarely considered in the
area of web engineering and design. When using the en-
cryption and hashing, some users have observed that the
CPU overhead of sending and receiving encrypted requests,
and the hashing verification to be as high as 100 to 200 mil-
liseconds per request, easily overwhelming any other pro-
cessing [13]. This overhead varies widely by implementa-
tion, key length and other factors, but it is always costly in
performance terms. Therefore, we have benched the data
for two cases: SHA1 (10 digits), ad SHA1-extended (16
digits).
We use the second case of hashing function (case of
SHA1-extended) in the WCVR prototype. Although this
case is more costly in performance terms (see Table 1 and
Table 2) because by design, longer keys take much more
computing resource to decrypt, making them less vulnera-
ble to attack by repetitive means. Unfortunately, this also
means that legitimate users pay a substantial cost for secu-
rity.
5.2. End-to-End Performance Evaluation
A load test can be used to test an application’s robust-
ness and performance, as well as its hardware and band-
width capacities. Therefore, we used the Neoload1 applica-
tion which is a stress and load testing tool to (i) test a web
site’s vulnerability to crashing under load and (ii) check re-
sponse times under the predicted load.
As the verification and recovery processes are performed
online in real-time, it should induce a time overhead in the
service. The results presented in this section have been ob-
tained on the same set of requests, using the same architec-
ture of web servers.
Note that, the duration of the test was almost exactly
30 minutes where the run-time policy was ramping up (i.e.
Generating a number of virtual users that increases through-
out the test) from 2 users adding 2 users every 2 minutes.
The virtual users were connecting at 100Mbps through a
local network.
All these measurements were performed from the client
point of view. Each row in the table displays the average
response time (request), maximum response time (request),
and minimum response time (request) in seconds, of all re-
quests during the test and average page response time for all
pages where each page may contain a number of requests.
Note that the average response time is the mean-time neces-
sary to process a request by each web server when the proxy,
browser, and the WCVR system are active. Activating the
WCVR implies the creation of lots of communications, the
activation of the verification process, and activation of re-
covery component if the server-side static and/or dynamic
web content has been compromised and tampered with. The
communications (network response time) are parts of the
measured durations. The WCVR tested is a prototype, and
thus is not really optimised.
5.2.1. Experimental Case Study
This experimental study has been conducted by undergrad-
uate computing student at Northumbria University and has
consisted of two parts: case study for static web content,
and case study for dynamic web content. Case study for
static web content is represented by experiments one and
two, whereas case study for dynamic web content is repre-
sented by experiment three. We have summarised the re-
sults in a specific table for each part.
Case Study - Static web content
Experiment one and two are individually carried out on
MS Windows environment, IIS and Tomcat web servers.
Experiment one is designed to show end-to-end perfor-
mance measurement through the proposed WCVR system
1http://www.neotys.com/
and the DSSA existing system on IIS web server over lo-
cal network for verification of server-side static web con-
tent integrity, whereas experiment two is designed to show
end-to-end performance measurement through the proposed
WCVR system and the DSSA existing system on Tomcat
web server.
We obtain a statistics summary after running each sys-
tem individually, as shown in Table 3. In this study - ex-
periment one, 9130 hits were created, 6096 web resources
were requested out, 57.22MB (total throughput) were re-
ceived, and number of virtual users were launched in this
test was between 114 and 207. In experiment two, 11041
hits were created, 6116 web resources were requested out,
89.84MB (total throughput) were received, and number of
virtual users was between 88 and 89.
Table 3. Static web content: Comparison between the re-
sponse times through DSSA or WCVR systems, in sec-
onds, of all requests during the test on IIS and Tomcat
web servers.
System Web 
Server
Graph Min
(request)
Average
Response Time 
(request)
Graph Max
(request)
Average 90%
(request)
Average Page 
Response Time
DSSA IIS 0.165 4.03 4.48 4.06 3.84 
WCVR IIS 0.073 1.06 4.12 0.951 1.63  
DSSA Tomcat 0.117 3.86 4.71 4.04 3.96 
WCVR Tomcat 0.07 1.93 90.3 0.834 3.46 
As a result, the end-to-end performance of WCVR sys-
tem is clearly very effective. This is because the overhead of
WCVR system on the both web servers (IIS, and Tomcat)
are minimal and very low in comparison with the DSSA
mechanism (see Table 3). The average response time (re-
quest) of WCVR on IIS was 1.06 seconds and on Tomcat
was 1.93 seconds where the average response time (request)
of DSSA on IIS was 4.03 seconds and on Tomcat was 3.86
seconds. The results indicate that the WCVR is less costly
in performance terms to verify the server-side static web
content against tampering attacks on IIS and Tomcat web
servers.
Case Study - Dynamic Web Content
Experiment three is designed to show end-to-end perfor-
mance measurement through the proposed WCVR system
over wired network on Tomcat web server for verification
of server-side dynamic web content integrity. In this exper-
iment three, the response times for Scenario A (No mecha-
nisms or systems for tamper protection, and recovery) and
Scenario B (With WCVR system) were collected.
In this part of study, 5421 hits were created, 5397 re-
sources were requested out, and 1.55MB (total throughput)
were received. Number of virtual users were launched in
this test was between 198 and 204.
As is shown in Table 4, the end-to-end performance of
Table 4. DynamicWeb Content: Comparison between the
response times through without verification system or
WCVR systems, in seconds, of all requests during the
test on Tomcat web server.
System Web Server Graph Min
(request)
Average
Response Time 
(request)
Graph Max
(request)
Average Page 
Response Time
Without verific-
ation system
Tomcat 0.029 3.14 4.86 3.24
WCVR Tomcat 0.219 3.95 6.01 3.97 
WCVR system is nearly effective and acceptable because
the overhead of WCVR system on Tomcat web server is
minimal in comparison with response times for Scenario A.
The average response time (request) of WCVR on Tomcat
was 3.95 seconds, whereas the average response time (re-
quest) through without verification system on Tomcat was
3.14 seconds. It is suggested that the results indicate the
WCVR is nearly similar response time to execute and ver-
ify the server-side static web content against tampering at-
tacks on Tomcat web server compared without verification
system. Therefore, theWCVR satisfies the performance ob-
jective for integrity verification of server-side web content.
6. Conclusions
Data integrity can be violated on the server even though
the communication channel between the server and client
is secure. We have presented a novel WCVR system.
The framework architecture of WCVR system consists of
a number of components: web register, response hashing
calculator, integrity verifier, and recovery.
To conclude, the performance ofWCVR system is nearly
effective on Tomcat and IIS web servers. Therefore, the
WCVR has satisfied the performance objective and accept-
able.
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